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Within sensorimotor enactivism, 
thought serves to refine our implicit 
mastery of sensorimotor 
contingencies. 
Evaluating the Role of Thought in Sensorimotor Enactivism
Research Questions
Within Sensorimotor Enactivism, (1) what 
is the role of thought, and (2) what is its 
connection to implicit bodily knowledge? 
- Sensorimotor contingencies (SMCs) describe the 
way changes in our body position affect changes in 
our environment
- When we have implicit knowledge of these 
contingencies, our bodies understand how to move 
in order to successfully navigate our environments
▪ Since thinking about our actions involves 
hesitation, navigation is more efficient when 
we can rely solely on our mastery of SMCs
▪ When performing new actions or exploring 
new environments, our implicit knowledge is 
more likely to be insufficient 
▪ In these cases, we can rely on thought to 
regulate implicit tendencies 
▪ Explicit knowledge derived from thought has 
the potential to become implicit bodily 
knowledge
Basics of Sensorimotor Enactivism 
(SSM) 
▪ SSM claims that consciousness is 
embodied, meaning that it is 
constituted by both neural and 
extra-neural bodily processes. 
▪ When we navigate our 
environments, we enact our own 
conscious experiences
▪ Perception and action are directly 
linked; perception is always 
guided by potential action
▪ Unlike most traditional theories 
of cognition, SSM argues that 
‘There is no ‘‘re’’-presentation of 
the world inside the brain: the 
only pictorial or 3D version 
required is the real outside 
version’ (O’Regan & Noe, 2001, 
p. 946)
Husserl’s Account of Time Consciousness
• Our experience of the present moment 
has temporal duration; it is not a series of 
snapshots
• The subjective present consists of three 
parts: retention (retaining the past 
moment), primal impression 
(processing the fleeting present), and 
protention (anticipation of the future)
https://www.researchgate.net/figure/From-an-embodied-cognition-perspective-cognition-is-seen-as-an-
emergent-property-of_fig1_270794876
Linking SSM, Thought, and Time 
Consciousness
• protentions reflect our implicit 
knowledge of SMCs
• When our mastery of SMCs is 
insufficient, these protentions are 
unfulfilled
• unfulfilled protentions can initiate 
thought regarding temporal duration
• Thought is therefore a way for us to 
recognize temporal duration without (a) 
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